The Global Pivot, Quad, and Geopolitics in the Shadow of the Russia-Ukraine War

Authors

  • Dr. Dileep Kumar Verma Government Degree College, Sehmo, Basti, Uttar Pradesh, India Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.68219/qh7bsb70

Keywords:

Russia–Ukraine War, Geopolitical Realignment, Strategic Autonomy, International Security

Abstract

The Russia-Ukraine War has become one of the key drivers for geopolitical re-orientation in the world that will deepen the division of the post-Cold War world and the strategic alignment of Europe, the Indo-Pacific and the rest. While the conflict is centered in Europe, its effects are felt throughout energy production, global supply chains, military strategy, technological competition and economic security and the relationship between the United States, China and Russia. It is in this way that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with the United States, India, Japan and Australia has become more important than ever. In this paper we review how the Russia-Ukraine War has influenced a global geopolitical pivot and the Quad as a flexible mechanism for Indo-Pacific security and coordination. The paper also analyzes India's position in the middle of competing geopolitical challenges in the face of competing geopolitical pressures and India and its position at the intersection of competing geopolitical pressures in order to pursue strategic autonomy - India's balancing act of pursuing strategic autonomy and cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia and Russia and at the same time building closer cooperation with the US, Japan and Australia to support the US, Japan and Australia and maintaining good relations with Russia. The Ukraine conflict has not turned the Quad into a military alliance of nations in one shape or form of military alliance but rather has only served to solidify its role as a flexible minilateral mechanism to deal with that challenge of an ever more contesting and interdependent world order and to respond to the ever more dynamic and interrelated world order. The Quad’s future success will be measured in terms of how effective it will be in the long term in relation to an ever more competitive and globalizing world order if it will be able to balance differences in national interests with the interests of different interests, China’s growing strategic power, in relation to China’s growing strategic ambitions, in the face of China’s growing economic interest, and also the wider global geopolitics and in the context of more than one-to-one relationships and global geopolitics as it is now more vulnerable and interdependent.

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Author Biography

  • Dr. Dileep Kumar Verma, Government Degree College, Sehmo, Basti, Uttar Pradesh, India

    Dr. Dileep Kumar Verma
    Department of Political Science 
    Government Degree College, Sehmo, Basti, Uttar Pradesh, India

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Published

2026-09-14

How to Cite

The Global Pivot, Quad, and Geopolitics in the Shadow of the Russia-Ukraine War. (2026). International Journal of Law, Public Policy and Global Governance (IJLPG), 1(1), 21-54. https://doi.org/10.68219/qh7bsb70